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R
amp meters have been used to manage
trafﬁc entering the freeway in order to
maximize ﬂow through bottlenecks.
However, meters are crude devices that can-
not discriminate based on trip purpose or the
value of the vehicle in the queue. The year
2000 saw unprecedented public opposition
to the ramp metering system in the Twin
Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul. This
resulted in the Minnesota state legislature
mandating a shutdown of the meters as part
of an experiment to test the effectiveness of
the ramp metering system. Cambridge Sys-
tematics (2001) and Levinson et al. (2002)
concluded from the eight-week shutdown
that the effectiveness of ramp metering var-
ied by location. In 2001, similar controversy
arose over the effectiveness of the high occu-
pancy vehicle (HOV) lanes. The controver-
sies have resulted in consideration of creative
ideas to improve the effectiveness of the
highway system. One such idea is allowing
high value vehicles, especially trucks, to buy
into HOV capacity.
Congestion is a transportation externali-
ty caused by the difference in the delay dri-
ver’s face and what they impose on others.
The primary objective of congestion pricing
is to internalize this cost by imposing a toll to
optimize road usage (Levinson 2002). Allow-
ing high value vehicles to buy their way out
of congestion is a form of value pricing,
which sorts vehicles by their value of time
(VoT).
Every vehicle has a value of time deter-
mined by a set of factors that are speciﬁc to
the driver, passengers and cargo of that vehi-
cle. In general, trucks have a higher VoT than
passenger cars. While both have drivers, the
driver of a truck is paid a wage and the truck
is carrying valuable time-sensitive goods;
some goods have a very high value of time,
especially freight like perishables, medicines,
and computer chips.
Tolling and congestion pricing are closely
related. Although tolling has been the pri-
mary form for funding private and some
public roads, tolling serves as a means to
implement congestion pricing. A direct con-
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This paper analyzes the opening of a high occupancy vehicle (HOV) ramp meter bypass to
trucks that pay a toll. Trucks are similar to HOVs as both have higher values of time than
single-occupant cars. Thus a time saving for these vehicles beneﬁts the transportation system.
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sequence of pricing of selected lanes is a
transfer of the waiting time across users. The
beneﬁts to a system from pricing are the
reduced delays for the high VoT users, but
the reduced delays for the paying vehicles
may be offset by the increased costs for other
users.
One of the more recent policies to im-
prove transportation system management is
encouraging the use of HOVs. These vehi-
cles, by virtue of their increased occupancy,
have a higher value of time than the single
occupant vehicles (SOV). There are incen-
tives to increase their usage such as lanes
open only to high occupancy vehicles. In the
Twin Cities area, in the 430 metered on-
ramps, HOVs are given bypasses at 73 on-
ramps. However, Dahlgren (1998) argues
that HOV lanes are in general underutilized
and it is better to open them to the public as
a tolled lane. In addition, Rogers (1985) also
concludes that the presence of a ramp meter
bypass did not result in a signiﬁcant increase
in the number of high occupancy vehicle
users and that it resulted in a shift in the
number of users from the ramps that did not
have bypasses.
Currently, at ramp entrances, high occu-
pancy vehicles are allowed to use a ramp
meter bypass that leads directly onto the
freeway without delay. The underlying con-
cept is that, since HOVs carry more people,
the system gains if the delay of such cars is
reduced. Like high occupancy vehicles,
trucks have a larger loss of utility (welfare)
than SOVs for the same delay since they have
a higher value of time Therefore, the trucks
and the system should beneﬁt if these vehi-
cles were allowed to bypass the queue at the
on-ramp.
As seen in Figure 1, the arriving trucks
would be allowed to choose between the
tolled bypass and the untolled on-ramp. If
the truck decides to take the bypass, its delay
is reduced but it imposes an additional delay
to the vehicles in the queue or to the vehicles
Figure 1: Ramp Meter Bypass
Note: Current practice only permits HOVs to use the ramp meter bypasses83
on the freeway. The bypass actually serves
as a shortcut in the queue. The truck that
paid the toll and entered the freeway essen-
tially jumps the queue from the back to the
front. 
This paper argues that since HOV lanes
are underutilized and trucks have a higher
value of time than single occupant vehicles,
that trucks be permitted to pay for access to
these high occupancy vehicle lanes and ramp
meter bypasses. This is a similar, but more
specialized version of the high occupancy toll
lanes that have been proposed and used on
I-15 in San Diego (Fielding and Klein 1993;
Poole and Orski 1999). This paper has been
organized as follows. The ﬁrst section of the
paper develops the theory behind congestion
pricing and a description of the optimal toll
estimation based on the different scenarios.
The following section describes the method-
ology to determine the toll. The queuing
model used and the assumptions are dis-
cussed in the subsequent sections. The last
two sections are the results and the conclu-
sions.
CONGESTION PRICING
The direct consequence of tolling can be
visualized as a shift in the trafﬁc. We know
that by tolling a route, the cost to users of
taking that particular route increases, forcing
some vehicles off the tolled route. Consider
the situation shown in Figure 2. The demand
for the ramp meter bypass decreases as gen-
eralized cost (toll plus travel time) rises. The
supply curve is assumed constant (average
variable collection cost per vehicle). The toll
is generally set at any value above this col-
lection cost. If the toll is set such that the
generalized cost is at C
1, then corresponding
demand is Q1. If the toll is increased such
that the generalized cost rises to C2, then the
number of users declines from Q1 to Q2. The
amount of the demand reduction is a direct
function of the toll increase (C2- C1) and the
price elasticity of demand.
The presence of a slower untolled alter-
native to a toll road ensures that drivers have
a choice and the toll is not forced on them.
The toll is the key parameter that needs to
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be estimated under a tolling scenario. This
value is determined based on the overall
objective of the congestion pricing scenario.
Two entities govern the overall objective.
The ﬁrst entity is users (SOVs, HOVs, toll
paying trucks, and nontoll paying trucks),
and the other entity is the toll authority.
Therefore, there are three distinct possibili-
ties. We could maximize the gains of either
entity or both the entities. The gains are
measured as the consumers’ surplus and the
producer’s surplus.
Before we proceed to analyze the cases,
we deﬁne the units that measure the two
quantities—the consumers’ surplus and the
producer’s surplus. Essentially the producer
(the toll authority) has a small toll collection
cost per vehicle, say, ci, per vehicle ‘i’. Then
the producer’s surplus (the proﬁts) is equal to
the revenues that are generated from the
tolling scheme less the toll collection costs.
The toll authority collects the toll (τ-i) from
vehicle ‘i’ if it takes the tolled route. Now the
producer’s surplus can be measured as 
Σ (τi – ci).
The consumers’ surplus is the difference
between the costs users incur and the costs
that users are willing to pay. Since the actual
amount that the users are willing to pay can-
not be determined, we compare the base case
(Scenario 1) where the use of the bypass is
prohibited and the case where the bypass is
permitted with payment of a toll (Scenario
2). The users do not have any choice in the
base case but have two alternatives in the
second case. If the choice-making process in
the second case is modeled using a logit
model, then the consumers’ surplus can be




µ=   scale parameter,
U
i
1 = the utility of alternative ‘i’ in 
Scenario 1,
Ui
2 = the utility of alternative ‘i’ in 
Scenario 2.
The logsum as deﬁned in (1) is the differ-
ence among expected maximum utilities in
the two scenarios. If utility is deﬁned to be
inversely proportional to travel time, then
the logsum measures the scaled difference in
travel times between the two alternatives. In
other words, the consumers’ surplus is repre-
sented as the scaled gain from the travel time
reduction based on the vehicle type and
value of time, less the toll paid. The scale
parameter in the logsum is taken to be 1, so
that the choice probability function is the
logit model.
Based on the above discussion, we can
deﬁne the objective function (F) for the three
cases of Toll Authority Proﬁt Maximization,
User Beneﬁt Maximization, and the System
Beneﬁt Maximization.
Toll Authority Proﬁt Maximization 
The ﬁrst objective is to maximize the toll
authority’s proﬁts. This is described in Figure
2. We are trying to ﬁnd the toll such that the
lower hatched region is maximized. The aim
is to estimate the optimal toll (τ*) as a trade-
off between the number of users and the
value of τ*. The ﬁxed costs of the toll
authority are ignored because the derivative
of the ﬁxed cost with respect to the toll col-
lected is zero, so it does not inﬂuence the
value of the optimal toll (τ*).
Maximize F = Σ (τi– ci)
Consumer Beneﬁt Maximization
The toll is set such that the user’s gain (scaled
travel times) is maximized. Graphically, we
are trying to maximize the upper shaded area
(in Figure 2). The objective function is as fol-
lows.85
Maximize F = Logsum
Logsum as deﬁned in (1).
System Beneﬁt Maximization
This is the case that involves setting (t) such
that the welfare of both the users and the toll
authority are maximized. There is a tradeoff
between the users and the toll. As the toll
increases, the number of users of the tolled
bypass declines, and the number in the con-
gested ramp queue increases.
Maximize F = Σ (τi– ci) + Logsum
CHOICE MODEL
The queuing and choice-making process is
modeled using simulation. Individual ar-
rivals and choices are simulated, and based
on the individual choices the objective func-
tion is calculated and a single toll for the
peak period is estimated.
The most important part of the simula-
tion is the choice-making process at the toll
booth. In this paper, random utility theory
is used to model the choice-making process
(Ben Akiva and Lerman 1985). The utility is
deﬁned to be inversely proportional to the
travel costs (toll and travel times). The toll
(τ) is the cost charged to use the bypass and
the delay (d) is scaled in money units using
the value of time. Therefore, the utility of the
tolled lane (Uτ) can be deﬁned as shown in
(2) and the utility of the untolled lane (Uτ)
can be deﬁned as shown in (3).
(2) U =  –  τ + ε
(3) Uτ = – α*d + ε
Where,
α = VoT, 
ε =  error term/random variations in the
utility.
Based on the utility associated with the two
alternatives ‘Uτ’ and ‘Uτ’, the probability of
choosing the tolled alternative (P (τ))
1 is
deﬁned as shown in (4). This is the logit
model representation of the choice-making
process. Using this probability function, the
choice-making process can be modeled sto-
chastically in the queue simulation.
(4) P (τ) = 1/ (1 + e 
(Ut – Ut))
P (t) = 1 – P(τ)
QUEUE SIMULATION
The basic pattern that is followed at the on-
ramps is the First Come, First Serve (FCFS)
queuing system. All vehicles using a ramp
form queues and leave in the order of their
arrival. Typically, the arrival rate is a random
variable and it increases near the peak period
and reduces as the peak period ends. In this
paper, we assume that the arrivals are ran-
dom about a mean value and the departure
rate is the ramp meter rate.
Once a truck adopts the tolled route, it
bypasses the queue and enters the freeway
directly. The freeway conditions determine
the ramp-metering rate. The consequence of
this is an increased service time for the ramp
meter, as there is an additional user on the
freeway, and the ramp meter red time
increases. Thus by tracking each truck and
its choice, the departure rate and the delay
for all other vehicles are determined.
For the hypothetical on-ramp as described
(Figure 1) a stochastic queue is used to rep-
resent the ﬂow. The ﬂow parameters on the
freeway are assumed to be constant over the
peak period, so the ramp-metering rate is
held constant over the peak period.
Arrival Rate
(5) h = 
The arrival rates (headway) are randomly
distributed about a mean value.
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Where, 
h = headway, 
x = random number between (0, 1), 
￿ = mean arrival rate.
In this paper, we have assumed a step shaped
mean arrival rate, an approximation to reﬂect
the peak period case where the arrival rate
builds up and ﬁnally dissipates. This is depict-
ed in Figure 3. The step function is divided
into three equal intervals over the entire sim-
ulation period. The assumed values of the
mean arrival rate (￿) are given in Table 1. The
simulations were repeated for three different
congestion levels—low, moderate, and high.
Service Rate
The service rate is the ramp-metering rate.
The ramp meter red times used in the Twin
Cities currently range from 2.2 seconds to 17
seconds. In this research, the red times of 5,
10, and 15 seconds have been used to repre-
sent low, moderate, and high congestion con-
ditions. For every truck that takes the
bypass, the ramp meter skips one cycle to
maintain the overall departure rate of the
queue.
The simulated queue has a combination
of stochastic and deterministic queuing. In
the ﬁrst step, the mean arrival rate is less
than the departure rate and hence we have
stochastic queuing, but towards the center of
the peak period, there is deterministic queu-
ing, as the mean arrival rate exceeds the
departure rate.
The arriving vehicle is randomly assigned
as a truck or auto based on the fraction of
trucks in the trafﬁc stream (f). For every
arriving truck, the expected delay is calcu-
lated as a function of the queue length ahead
of it and the service rate. Based on the
expected delay, the truck makes a choice of
taking the tolled route, which is modeled sto-
chastically. Using a random number sampled
from the uniform distribution, and the
choice probability calculated from the
expected delay or toll, a choice is made for
that truck. This represents the case wherein
the driver looks at the conditions ahead and
makes a choice. Thus each truck’s choice
process is modeled. If the vehicle is an auto,
it does not have a choice and is added to the
ramp.
Figure 3: Step Shaped Mean Arrival Rate in Peak Period87
Value of Time
The value of time for the vehicle is a function
of its characteristics. There have been many
studies to determine the VoT and there is no
single value we can assign. The studies in the
literature have estimated value of time based
on trip type, vehicle type, and location. The
following three studies include these esti-
mates for autos. Beesley (1965) made one of
the early estimates from a survey of a set of
government employees in London and he
concluded that it is typically 33% to 50% of
the average hourly income. Using the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, the US average
hourly wage rate is around $15.36 (1999
dollars). So, the value of time would be in a
range of $5/hour to $7.5/hour. The VoT as
used by Highway Economic Requirements
System (HERS) scaled to 1999 dollars using
the Employment Cost Index (ECI) is
$17.30/hour (Federal Highway Administra-
tion 2000). The study by Daniel McFadden
(1974), where he developed a travel demand
model to determine the mode choice between
auto and transit after the introduction of the
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART), concluded
that the in-vehicle value of time for autos is
$1.23/hour (1973 dollars) and the waiting
time is $2.34/hour, which is equivalent to
$7.5/hour (1999 dollars). In our research,
VoT for every arriving car was assigned from
a uniform distribution between $7.75/hour
to $17.75/hour. 
Kawamura (2000) showed from a stated
preference survey among various freight
companies, that the value of time can be well
replicated using a log normal distribution.
The study was a survey conducted among
different trucking agencies in California and
the estimated values were not for a speciﬁc
truck type, but for the general class of com-
mercial trucks. For the truckers, it was esti-
mated to have a mean of $23.40/hour and a
standard deviation of $32/hour. This is
implemented in the queuing model as a log-
normal of equivalent mean 2.64 and stan-
dard deviation 1.139. The value of time for
every arriving truck is sampled from this log
normal distribution.
Toll Collection
There are a number of ways to implement
toll collection. If this were to be implement-
ed, electronic tolling is likely, eventually. 
The system may begin with simpler tech-
nologies, particularly in a trial period. How-
ever, to use a conservative estimate of the toll
collection costs, manual toll collection costs
are used in the simulation. The manual toll
collection costs were taken from Levinson
(2002) as 8.5 cents per vehicle. These are
costs from a tolling study in the San Francis-
co Bay area.
Simulation Details
For every additional vehicle arriving, the sys-
tem parameters—the queue length on the
ramp and the ramp-metering rate are updat-
ed. In addition, after each arrival has been
modeled, the objective function (the toll
authority proﬁts, the beneﬁt to the road user)
is calculated. We start the simulation at t=0,
and generate 1,000 arrivals. This process is
repeated for the different values of the toll
assumed.
In all the simulations, it is assumed that
the high occupancy vehicles that would be
using the bypass are ignored, since they are
a very small proportion of the trafﬁc and are
unaffected by the additional trucks on the
bypass. The simulations are repeated 50
times to average the stochastic variations and
repeated for the three scenarios of low, mod-
erate, and high congestion. Table 1 lists the
assumed values of the simulation model.
RESULTS
For each of the three different scenarios (low,
moderate, and high congestion) the variation
of the toll authority proﬁts, total user bene-
JTRF / RAMP METER BYPASSES88
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ﬁt and the system beneﬁt have been plotted
in Figures 4, 5, and 6. 
First observations on the results—only the
toll authority proﬁt maximization scenario
has produced a nonzero optimal toll. Both
the user beneﬁt maximization and the system
beneﬁt maximization have produced zero
optimal tolls. Also, as we move across sce-
narios, we can see that the type of the varia-
tion in the toll authority’s proﬁt is similar for
the three scenarios. As the red times of the
ramp meter increase, the curves shift along
the increasing direction, an indication that
the optimal toll under toll authority proﬁt
maximization increases with congestion.
The toll authority proﬁt maximization
scenario has produced our expected result.
The shape of the curve reﬂects the tradeoff
between the toll and proﬁts. The user bene-
ﬁt maximization scenario indicates that the
user gains are a maximum at zero-toll. This
is explained as follows. Since we are trying to
maximize the consumers’ surplus, the upper
shaded area (Figure 2) is maximized at a zero
cost, and hence we have a zero toll.
The more interesting result is the zero-toll
for the system beneﬁt maximization. The
zero-toll can be explained as follows. In this
scenario, we are trying to maximize the con-
sumers’ surplus plus producer’s surplus.
When there is no toll, the toll authority has
no cost and no revenue. Therefore, the con-
sumers’ surplus governs the maximization
process and it is maximized at a zero-toll.
Introducing tolls and toll collection immedi-
ately results in a welfare loss (Figure 2).
One important point that needs to be
noted is that even though the total time gains
in the system are nearly zero (the total delay
is nearly constant) the delays experienced by
separate vehicles are scaled with different val-
ues of time. Hence the system gains when the
higher VoT vehicles have more travel time
savings than the lower VoT vehicles. In addi-
tion the toll paid is a transfer within the sys-
tem across the users and the toll authority.
Table 1: Assumed Model Values
Item Value
Fraction of trucks in the trafﬁc stream (%) 10
VoT for car (Range) (dollars/hr) 7.75 – 17.75 
VoT for truck (Mean) (dollars /hr) 26.80
VoT for truck (Standard Deviation) (dollars /hr) 32.00
Number of vehicles simulated 1000
Toll in steps of 0.5 (dollars) 0 - 19.5 
Number of simulation runs per toll 50
Ramp Meter Red time (seconds)
Scenario – I 5
Scenario – 2 10
Scenario – 3 15
Mean Arrival Rates of the 3 steps (vehicles/seconds)
Scenario – I 0.06, 0.09, 0.03
Scenario – 2 0.1, 0.12, 0.05
Scenario – 3 0.2, 0.25, 0.189
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Therefore the system gains are only the trav-
el time savings scaled by the value of time.
The last feature of the results is compari-
son between the base case that prohibits the
trucks from using the bypass and the case
where they are allowed to pay a toll and use
the bypass. Since the beneﬁts of the bypass to
the user are positive, it implies that the
bypass at any toll is a better alternative to the
base case, which prohibits trucks from using
the bypass.
CONCLUSIONS
Opening the HOV ramp meter bypass as a
tolled lane for trucks—an identiﬁable class of
vehicles in the trafﬁc stream was proposed
in this paper. A single peak period toll was
proposed. The optimal toll was estimated
under three different scenarios—toll author-
ity proﬁt maximization, user beneﬁt maxi-
mization, and system beneﬁt maximization.
The toll authority proﬁt maximization case
resulted in a nonzero toll that increased with
delays/congestion. System beneﬁts were
maximized at a zero toll. This implies that
the bypass should be free to the trucks. This
raises equity issues that need to be addressed.
Society is better off by opening ramp meter
bypasses to trucks at any toll. However, the
road owner must ﬁnd a toll that is political-
ly acceptable, which may be between the
proﬁt-maximizing toll and zero. Also the use
of toll revenues would need to be considered.
This paper has important implications for
policies regarding the ramp meter HOV
bypass lanes. As our research has indicated,
it is more beneﬁcial to open the underutilized
lanes as Truck Toll lanes, so the ramp meter
bypass could be used in a manner similar to
a High Occupancy Truck Toll (HOTT) lane.
Excessive trafﬁc on the bypass will not only
delay SOV commuters signiﬁcantly and incur
political opposition but also undermine the
effectiveness of ramp meters. Opening
underutilized high occupancy vehicle lanes,91
as tolled lanes would be appropriate for a
small and easily discriminated portion of
trafﬁc such as trucks.
A proposal such as this should be wel-
come in the trucking industry, particularly
for the express carriers, because they can
save time spent on the metered ramps. The
tolling scheme need not be dynamic in real
time and an inexpensive administrative sys-
tem such as prepaid passes may be workable. 
However, the next question is the issue of
equity. A truck toll scheme allows trucks to
buy their way to the front of the line at the
expense of those behind. We can alleviate
this by delaying only those behind the truck
and not the vehicles already in the queue, at
a small cost to the trafﬁc already on the free-
way. The other important question is what to
do with the collected money. Since this is
being done on a small scale there is little
money to be distributed. Returning the
money to the people delayed on the ramp or
investing in transportation facilities might
be appropriate.
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Endnotes
1. For the derivation of the logit choice probability, see Ben Akiva and Steve Lerman (1985).
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